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Antitrust laws' and patent laws2 are sometimes assumed to serve
opposite purposes.' However, both antitrust and patent have as their
economic focal point the maximization of wealth by enabling the produc-
tion of consumer goods at the lowest price.' Both antitrust and patent
* This article was completed as part of the Senior Research Program at Northwestern
University School of Law under the supervision of Professor James A. Rahl. The author gratefully
acknowledges the generous guidance and support of Professor Rahl. The author also thanks
Professor David Van Zandt of the Northwestern University School of Law for his helpful criticism
of the article. Some of the ideas for this article were derived from conversations with Professor
Valentine Korah of University College, London, to whom the author is indebted for her generosity
and thoughtful comments. While this article benefits from the assistance of these people, any
mistakes or misconceptions are solely those of the author.
** Associate, Marshall, O'Toole, Gerstein, Murray & Bicknell; J.D. Northwestern University
School of Law (1991).
1 Here, "antitrust laws" refers to both the antitrust laws of the United States embodied in the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1; the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12; the Federal Trade Commission Act,
15 U.S.C. § 41; and the Robinson-Patman Acts, 15 U.S.C. § 13c; and the competition laws of the
European Economic Community embodied in Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty establishing the
European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
2 For the purpose of this article, the term "patent laws" refers generally to the body of world
intellectual property law relating to patents.
3 United States v. Line Material, 333 U.S. 287 (1948); Int'l Wood Processors v. Power Dry,
Inc., 792 F.2d 416 (4th Cir. 1986); see also Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reap-
praisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813 (1984).
4 Rule, The Administration's View: Antitrust Analysis After the Nine No-No's, 55 ANTITRUST
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laws also seek output expansion - antitrust by prohibiting monopoliza-
tion; and patent by making available technology that would otherwise be
kept out of the public domain.5
Still, some courts and commentators persist in thinking that the pat-
ent system is somehow antithetical to sound antitrust policy. 6 In no in-
stance is the tension between patent and antitrust law greater than in the
area of patent licensing.7 In both the United States and the European
Communities8, a patentee can refuse to license and not be subject to anti-
trust scrutiny9 . However, once the patentee licenses the invention, the
antitrust laws apply to any restrictive aspects of the license agreement.10
Thus, restrictions on what a licensee may do with the patented technol-
ogy or know-how 1 that is the subject of the license can raise antitrust
concerns. Such concerns are seldom justified except in situations in
which the license restriction has the effect of 1) restricting competition
among technologies that are economic substitutes, 2) excluding new tech-
nologies from the market, or 3) actually facilitating other anticompetitive
ends.'2
The courts of both the United States and the European Communi-
ties have upheld the legality of various licensing restrictions.1 3 One such
L.J. 365, 369 (1986). It is interesting to note that patents were originally exceptions to the English
Statute of Monopolies of 1623.
5 These topics are considered in detail infra at text accompanying notes 18-40.
6 See, eg., Sobel, The Antitrust Interface with Patents and Innovation: Acquisition of Patents;
Improvement Patents and Grant-Backs, Non-Use, Fraud on the Patent Office, Development of New
Products and Joint Research, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 681 (1984).
7 See Marks, Patent Licensing and Antitrust in the United States and the European Economic
Community, 35 AM. U.L. REV. 963, 966 n.15 (1986).
8 There are three European Communities: the European Economic Community, established by
the EEC Treaty; the European Coal and Steel Community, established by the ECSC Treaty; and the
European Atomic Energy Community, established by the Euratom Treaty. Unless otherwise noted,
this article refers only to the European Economic Community. However, the European Communi-
ties are increasingly being considered as a single European Community. For instance, the ECSC will
likely be completely absorbed by the EEC.
9 Some European nations do, under certain conditions, require licensing of some patents (for
example, in the health field). See Allen & Hasbury's, Ltd. v. Generics (UK), Ltd., I Common Mkt.
L.R. 619 (1985). Cf. Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902) (refusing to require licens-
ing of a patent in the United States).
10 See, eg., Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2349/84 of 23 July 1984, 127 J.O. COM. EUR.
(No. L. 219) 15 (1984) [hereinafter Regulation 2349/84]; and Commission Regulation (EEC) No.
556/89 of 30 Nov. 1988, 32 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 61) 1 (1989) [hereinafter Regulation 556/89];
both setting forth the requirements for licensing.
11 "Know-how" comprises the technical information that is often necessary to effectively use a
patented invention. Thus, many licenses confer rights to both patented technology and unpatented
know-how. However, it is possible that the subject matter of a license could be only the patented
technology or only the unpatented know-how. See also infra note 53.
12 See Rule, supra note 4, at 369.
13 See infra text accompanying notes 72-126.
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restriction, the "field-of-use" restriction, is the subject of this article. A
field-of-use restriction prohibits a licensee from realizing the benefits of
the license in certain technical fields.14 Field-of-use restrictions are usu-
ally written as restricting use to a particular field rather than listing pro-
hibited fields. For example, a license might restrict the use of a
pharmaceutical compound to only veterinary applications, thus subject-
ing the licensee to liability if he or she uses the licensed subject matter in
a human medicine application or in any other application.
Although not the subject of as much litigation and commentary as
other restrictions 15, field-of-use restrictions serve an important function
in licensing. For example, a field-of-use restriction might allow a licensor
to keep a monopoly in one field while obtaining the benefits of licensing
(i.e. royalty payments) in another field. Also, a field-of-use restriction
might provide incentive for investment in a technology by firms that
could not risk the start-up costs if an established firm were already in the
field. These and other advantages of the field-of-use restriction will be
considered below.
This article first sets forth an economic justification for the legality
of field-of-use restrictions, concluding that such restrictions are usually
pro-competitive. The article then analyzes the relevant law in both the
United States and the European Communities to determine the ways in
which these two bodies of law are similar or different, and the extent to
which the courts, the Commission, and various agencies have recognized
the pro-competitive effects of field-of-use restrictions. The article con-
cludes that the legal structure governing licensing agreements in the Eu-
ropean Communities provides more predictable and useful guidance in
drafting transnational licensing agreements.
II. THE IMPACT OF FIELD-OF-USE RESTRICTIONS ON COMPETITION
The holder of a patent is in the enviable position of being a price
searcher exempt from the antitrust laws.16 Faced with a declining de-
mand curve, the patentee will search for a price for the patented subject
14 "Technical fields" is an ill-defined term of art that will be considered infra at text accompany-
ing notes 82-84.
15 For a discussion of the patent-antitrust interface in general, see Kaplow, supra note 3; for an
analysis of the competitive effects of licensing in general, see Note, Limiting the Anticompetitive
Prerogative of Patent Owners: Predatory Standards in Patent Licensing, 92 YALE L.J. 831 (1983); for
an economic analysis of royalty terms in patent licenses, see Comment, An Economic Analysis of
Royalty Terms in Patent Licenses, 67 MINN. L. REv. 1198 (1983).
16 This is true only as long as the patent is valuable in the sense that there exists a market for the
patent and that no unpatented substitutes exist that force the patentee to license on the competitive
market. Thus, the legal monopoly will usually have its highest economic value when competition for
the patented good is lowest. See generally F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
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matter such that an increment of production adds as much to revenue as
it does to cost. Thus, a patent monopolist will restrict output to obtain
the maximum price that the demand curve will allow. 7 The trade-off for
the dead weight loss caused by the patentee's behavior is that society
benefits by disclosure of the invention and promotion of technological
advancement. In other words, the social surplus lost by allowing monop-
oly pricing is recovered by the social value in providing incentives for
creativity and the subsequent disclosure of the fruits of the creative effort.
However, when the behavior of the patent monopolist restricts com-
petition outside the scope of the patent, there is additional loss of social
surplus that is not offset by the greater social value of promoting discov-
ery and disclosure. In that case, the antitrust and competition laws are
implicated. The licensing activity of the patentee should be analyzed in
this light. If licensing activity either promotes competition or does not
restrict competition in a field-of-use outside that covered by the patent,
the activity should be allowed - absent other restrictions. It is from this
perspective that the competitive effects of field-of-use restrictions will be
analyzed in the following discussion.
A. Procompetitive Aspects of Field-of-Use Restrictions
A licensor might wish to include use restrictions in his or her
licenses for a number of reasons.' 8 An example will illustrate this point.
Suppose that one wishes to license patented material which has, in the
simplest case, two distinct uses for which there is a market. For one of
the uses there are relatively inexpensive economic substitutes 9 but for
the other use there is no viable substitute20 . The monopoly power com-
manded by the second of these uses (the high-demand use) is greater than
that commanded by the use for which there are readily-available substi-
tutes (the low-demand use). Thus, the patent holder can afford to act
more like a monopolist in the case in which he or she is marketing the
high-demand use. Ideally, this means that if the patent holder licenses
the invention to a user who wishes to put the invention to the high-de-
mand use, the patent holder/licensor can charge a higher royalty than in
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 440-58 (1980) (arguing that most patents are not valuable as monopolies
in the economic sense).
17 See G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 201 (1987).
18 See, eg., Bleeke & Rahl, The Value of Territorial and Field-of-Use Restrictions in Interna-
tional Licensing of Unpatented Know-How: An Empirical Study, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 450, 454
(1979) ("Given the complexity of many modem processes and the different fields where such
processes often may be applied, it is natural that field-of-use restrictions will be sought..
19 I.e., the elasticity of demand is high.
20 Ie., the elasticity of demand is low.
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the case of a license granted to a user who intends only to put the patent
to the low-demand use.2 1
However, without a field-of-use restriction in either the license for
the low-demand use or the high-demand use, the result will be less com-
petition in the market for the low-demand use. The rationale for this
stems from the fact that without the ability to use a field-of-use restric-
tion, the licensor will be faced with three choices. First, the licensor
could license to all users at the royalty rate for the low-demand use.
That rate will essentially be dictated by the competitive price in the low-
demand market. In other words, given that readily-available economic
substitutes exist for the low-demand use, the royalty rate that low-de-
mand users are willing to pay will be determined, in part, by the price of
the available substitutes and not by restrictions in the number of licenses
granted for the low-demand use. Therefore, the licensor of the low-de-
mand use must operate as a price taker due to the effective competition
that exists in the market for that use. Second, the licensor could charge
all users the royalty rate for the high-demand use. That rate will be the
monopoly rate due to the lack of available substitutes for goods applica-
ble to the high-demand use. Thus, at the high-demand rate, the licensor
is a price searcher and will restrict output in order to get the highest
royalty rate. Finally, the licensor could engage in a form of price dis-
crimination and charge the monopoly rate to high-demand users and the
competitive rate to low-demand users.
The first option is not tenable because the licensor would lose mo-
nopoly profits that could be made from the high-demand users. Thus, no
patentee whose desire it is to maximize profits will accept the first op-
tion.22 Likewise, the third option presents the problem that the licensor
may not be an effective price discriminator. Furthermore, a licensee, ab-
sent a contractual provision, may say it values the patented product only
at the low-demand price and then proceed to put the product to the high-
demand use.23 Thus, of the options outlined above, the licensor should
charge the monopoly royalty price for all licenses of the patent. 24 This is
so because the licensor would rather make the monopoly profits available
21 This, of course, is true only if one assumes that, even absent a field-of-use restriction, low-
demand users will only use the patented device for the low-demand use and high-demand users will
only put the patent to the high-demand use (Le., no user takes a license under the pretense of putting
the patent to the low-demand use and then subsequently switches to the high-demand use).
22 Option one does not diminish social surplus because the producer surplus that the patentee
would have obtained at the monopoly price is transferred directly to consumer surplus.
23 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
24 This will be subject to the assumption that a market exist for the high-demand use - an as-
sumption made implicitly above.
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for the high-demand use and forego the low-demand market altogether
than license at the competitive price in the low-demand market. This
would allow high-demand users to obtain a license at a royalty rate that
is much lower than the rate at which the high-demand user values the
patent.25 Given the choice, and the protection of the patent laws, a
profit-maximizing licensor will likely choose to appropriate the monop-
oly profits available from high-demand users.
Licensing at the monopoly-price, however, will have the effect of
pricing the invention out of the low-demand market because exclusively
low-demand users will turn to the available substitutes. Even high-de-
mand/low-demand users of the invention may find it cheaper to use sub-
stitutes for the invention in the low-demand use. Therefore, the lack of
an available field-of-use restriction will actually serve to decrease compe-
tition in the low-demand market.
In the foregoing example, it would make sense to allow a field-of-use
restriction with price differentiation.26 In such a system, competition
would increase at both the high-demand and low-demand uses. At the
high-demand use, the level of output of the licensed products would be
more competitive and the end products made from the patented material
would be available in a marketplace where they would not otherwise
have been.27 The market for the low-demand use would also be more
competitive because the number of economic substitutes for the low-de-
mand use would be increased by the presence of the patented material in
the low-demand market, thus driving price to a competitive equilibrium.
As a concrete example of the above, consider the recent discovery of
the intriguing new molecules called "Buckyballs" which can be easily
manipulated for numerous commercial uses including lubricants, batter-
ies, drugs, and fuels.28 Suppose that, because of their numerous potential
uses, Buckyballs are patented and the patentee wishes to license them for
commercial development. Further, suppose that Buckyballs are highly
valuable as lubricants - in fact, so valuable that they would completely
25 Of course, the patent holder does not have to license everyone. However, absent a field-of-use
restriction, it may be difficult to know with any degree of certainty the use to which a licensee will
ultimately put the invention.
26 Price differentiation, as used here, is different than either price discrimination as contemplated
under the Robinson-Patman Act or price discrimination in the economic sense. Differentiating be-
tween users in completely different fields in terms of the royalty rate charged raises neither tradi-
tional economic concerns nor the antitrust concerns expressed in the Robinson-Patman Act.
27 Obviously, if the patent holder withheld the patented material from the market, the material
itself as well as any end products generated from or by the material would not be put to their most
efficient use (assuming that it is cheaper for the patent holder to license than to retain the monopoly
on production).
28 See Buckyballs Give Researchers a Big Bounce, Wall St. J., Apr. 2, 1991, at B1, col. 3.
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replace conventional lubricants on the competitive market.2 9 However,
suppose Buckyballs were not as valuable as components of batteries in
that they would not compete any better than their economic substitutes
in the competitive battery market. If Buckyballs were only licensed to
firms that produced lubricants, the licensor could charge a royalty com-
mensurate with the high value of the lubricant to the lubricant manufac-
turer.30 However, if the licensor of Buckyballs grants a license to a
manufacturer of batteries, that manufacturer might have an incentive to
enter the market for lubricants.31 If the battery manufacturer does this,
it will have appropriated from the licensor profits which the licensor
might have made by licensing at the higher rate to a lubricant manufac-
turer. A licensor presented with such a dilemma will be discouraged
from licensing everyone. However, a field-of-use restriction in the latter
situation would alleviate the problem by making it possible for the licen-
sor to realize maximum profits in both fields. This will not only create an
incentive to license (ie. promote the development and dissemination of
technology) but will also have a pro-competitive effect in the low-demand
(here, the battery) industry.
Similar effects on price and competition occur when the licensor
wishes to reserve for itself one of several fields to which a patented inven-
tion may apply or when the licensor does not wish anyone to exploit one
of the fields. In either case, if the licensor does grant licenses, the royalty
price will increase to cover the licensor's opportunity cost of not being
able to reserve one or more fields. Thus, if a patent is applicable in two
different technical fields32 and the licensor wishes to license only one of
the fields, with no field-of-use restriction the licensor would be faced with
the choice of not licensing (due to a desire not to license one of the fields)
or of licensing to a licensee who may exploit both fields. In the former
case, one of the fields is not served (assuming that the licensor is unwill-
ing to or incapable of manufacturing in that field); in the latter case, the
licensor will charge a higher royalty, reflected in higher consumer prices
to cover the lost monopoly profits which the licensor would have made in
his or her chosen field. A field-of-use restriction would eliminate both of
these inefficient alternatives.
The foregoing analysis is supported empirically by a study com-
29 This lubricant property may actually be in doubt due to the fact that real Buckyballs cannot
withstand the heat that is often generated in situations in which lubricants are needed. Id.
30 This is so because if the licensee used the Buckyballs for one of the less-valued uses, the
licensor would not lose any money.
31 This assumes that start-up costs are not prohibitive in light of the profits the battery manufac-
turer expects to make.
32 See infra text accompanying notes 82-84.
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pleted by Bleeke and Rahl.33 Bleeke and Rahl report that if the United
States prohibited field-of-use restrictions in international know-how li-
censing agreements, many firms would increase their price for "technolo-
gies with wide applications."34 Other firms indicated that their future
licenses would "reflect the potential loss of control of an asset [the firm]
spent effort and money developing."35 Over fifty percent of the firms
surveyed said that they would either increase royalty rates or not license
know-how at all if field-of-use restrictions were outlawed.3 6 Thus, there
is practical support for the theoretical basis supporting field-of-use re-
strictions offered above.
B. Field-of-Use and Incentives to Enter the Market
Another reason for allowing field-of-use restrictions is that doing so
might facilitate the entry of a firm into a field in which it might not
otherwise be economical for the firm to enter. For instance, the holder of
a drug patent who wishes to license the use or manufacture of the drug,
useful in both the human and veterinary medical fields, might have sev-
eral choices as to whom he or she will grant a license. The patent holder
could grant a license to: 1) a firm that will use the drug solely in the
human medical field, 2) a firm that will use the drug solely in the veteri-
nary medical field, or 3) a firm that will use the drug in both fields. If one
assumes that there exist firms of each type described above, and in both
fields there are start-up costs which are not readily recoverable by price,
competition is best served if the licensor is allowed to use a field-of-use
restriction in his or her licenses.37
If a firm must expend capital to enter a market, it may be less will-
ing to enter the market if another firm already exists in the market which
has a low marginal cost of producing the market good. This is the ra-
tionale given by some for the grant of an exclusive license along with
field-of-use restrictions.38 However, that rationale only applies when one
or more established firms exist in the potential market. If no firms are
manufacturing, using, or selling the patented product, then competition
would be served best by licensing a number of firms in each field-of-use
33 See Bleeke & Rahl, supra note 18.
34 Id. at 478.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 480. The number of firms not licensing or charging higher royalties was even greater in
the hypothetical case in which territorial restrictions were prohibited.
37 The ability of a licensor to restrict fields may also lead to technological innovation by the
licensor in the form of improvements.
38 See generally V. KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EEC COMPETITION LAW AND
PRACTICE (4th ed. 1990).
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(i.e. the exclusivity provision should not be used). Each of the firms will
have roughly equivalent start-up costs; therefore, no firm will be dis-
suaded from entering the market due to the superiority of an already-
existing firm.39 As described below, the situation is different when firms
exist that are capable of entering the market immediately.
If the drug licensor described above grants licenses only to firms
that engage in the human medical field or only to firms in the veterinary
medical field but never to firms that engage in both fields, a field-of-use
restriction is not necessary.'4 In that case, the start-up cost for the veter-
inary firm to enter the human market, and for the human firm to enter
the veterinary market, would be equal and there would be no impairment
of competition. On the other hand, if the licensor first licensed a firm
that was capable of using the invention in either the veterinary field or in
the human field, the incentive for a firm to sink start-up costs into one
field or the other would be comparatively low because of the inherent
disadvantages to competing with the established firm.
Without a use restriction in the license to the firm capable of using
the invention in both fields, a firm that wishes to use the invention in only
one field will be deterred from entering that market. For example, sup-
pose Firm A has the facilities necessary both to produce a patented drug
for use in veterinary medicine and to meet the standards for human use.
Now suppose that Firm B wishes to begin producing the same patented
drug for use exclusively in the human medical field. Start-up costs in the
human field are high and no economic substitutes for the patented drug
exist. If Firm A is granted a license with no use restriction, Firm B will
have little incentive to enter the human medical field because its start-up
costs will serve as an effective barrier to entry. However, if Firm A is
granted a license with a restriction to use the drug only in the veterinary
field, Firm B will not be deterred from entering the human medical field
because, even if there are several licensees, they will all be on equal foot-
ing in entering the field.
C. The Patentee's Right to Full Exploitation of its Patent Rights
Both European and United States courts hold that a patentee is usu-
ally under no obligation to license his or her invention.4 By granting the
patent, the Government provides the patentee with an exclusive right to
39 A different situation presents itself when the potential for rent seeking exists. See infra text
accompanying notes 46-49.
40 This also assumes that start-up costs are the same in both fields.




make, use, or sell the invention as well as the potential for monopoly
power in exchange for public disclosure of the invention.42 Such a sys-
tem promotes "the Progress of Science and useful Arts"' and provides
incentive for technological advancement. It makes sense that if an inven-
tor is under no obligation to license and, in fact, the invention can remain
dormant for the term of the patent", the inventor (or its assignee) should
be able to grant a restrictive license as long as doing so does not impair
competition.
Thus, an inventor could restrict the field-of-use of the invention
such that the inventor retains monopoly power over one use and conveys
market power over another use through a license. Doing so restricts
competition in the field-of-use retained by the inventor; but such a re-
striction of competition is what the inventor was entitled to in the first
place (assuming a patent has issued). The conveyance of the other field-
of-use creates competition in a field in which competition would have
been less, absent the conveyance.45
This is not to say that simply because an inventor is given a monop-
oly over his or her invention that the law should allow the inventor to
restrict the invention's use ad librium. Rather, any restriction that pro-
motes competition in a given field (and does not illegally impair competi-
tion in another field) should be valid under the competition laws. Thus,
if a licensor's choice is between licensing with a use restriction to enhance
competition in a given field, or withholding a license due to a desire to
maintain monopoly power in another field, the law should encourage the
former.
D. Exclusive Licenses
A potentially different problem arises when the licensor conveys an
exclusive license with a field-of-use restriction. In that case, competition
is not created vis-a-vis the patented subject matter due to the exclusivity
clause. However, since a patentee may assign the entire right to make,
use, or sell the invention, he or she should be able to alienate part of that
right in many situations. This is the so-called inherency doctrine
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in General Talking Pictures
42 See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
43 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
44 The patent term in the United States is 17 years. In the European Communities, the term
varies according to national law, but can be as long as 20 years.
45 For a contrary point of view, see Adelman & Juenger, Patent-Antitrust: Patent Dynamics and
Field-of-Use Licensing, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 273 (1975).
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v. Western Electric Co.' Thus, under the inherency doctrine, an exclu-
sive license with a use restriction is no more a cause for concern than the
case described above for use restrictions in a non-exclusive license - albeit
for a different reason.
Exclusive dealing arrangements between licensors and licensees can
also alleviate the risks of sunk costs to investors in patented technology.
If a licensee must sink an initial capital investment into use of a patented
technology, the licensee assumes the risk that the licensor will hold it
hostage subject to the collection of additional rents. For example, sup-
pose that a manufacturer designs an end product to incorporate a special-
ized patented device, for which the manufacturer obtains a license and
which greatly increases the value of the end product. If the end product
cannot be adapted to use a substitute device, the manufacturer/licensee is
subject to being held up by the licensor for additional royalties. The
manufacturer/licensee will pay the additional royalties to the extent that
doing so is less expensive than modifying the end product or scrapping
the entire manufacturing process.
The licensor described above is in the advantageous position of be-
ing able to extract additional royalties because of the sunk costs that the
licensee has put into specializing its product for the patented device, and
because the licensor can turn to other potential licensees. An exclusive
license not only provides incentive for firms to enter a market, but also
prevents rent-seeking by an opportunistic licensor.
The benefits of exclusivity are expressly recognized in the European
Communities. In Recital 6 of Regulation 556/89, the Commission states
that "[e]xclusive licensing agreements, i.e. agreements in which the licen-
sor undertakes not to exploit the licensed technology in the licensed terri-
tory himself or to grant further licences there, may not be in themselves
incompatible with Article 85(1) ...... ,'4 The Regulation proceeds to
specifically recognize the benefits of exclusivity to industry in Recital 748
46 304 U.S. 175 (1937), aff'd on reh'g, 305 U.S. 124 (1938); see infra text accompanying notes
99-110.
47 Regulation 556/89, supra note 10, at Recital 6. Recital 6 is a reiteration of the legality of so-
called "open exclusive" licenses first announced in the Court of Justice's decision in Nungesser &
Eisele v. EEC Commission, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2015, 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 278 (1982).
48 Regulation 556/89, supra note 10, at Recital 7:
Both these and the other obligations listed in Article 1 encourage the transfer of technology
and thus generally contribute to improving the production of goods and to promoting technical
progress, by increasing the number of production facilities and the quality of goods produced in
the common market and expanding the possibilities of further development of the licensed tech-
nology. This is true, in particular, of an obligation on the licensee to use the licensed product
only in the manufacture of its own products, since it gives the licensor an incentive to dissemi-
nate the technology in various applications while reserving the separate sale of the licensed
product to himself or other licensees. ...
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and to consumers in Recital 949. Thus, exclusivity may be a tool for both
increased competition within a market and a means of facilitating market
entry.
III. FIELD-OF-USE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
A. General Applicability of Regulations 2349/84 and 556/89
The legality of patent license agreements in the European Commu-
nities is governed primarily by two regulations implementing Article 85
of the Treaty of Rome.5 0 The so-called group exemption, Commission
Regulation No. 2349/84 [hereinafter the Patent Regulation], applies Ar-
ticle 85(3) s" of the Treaty of Rome to patent licensing agreements. 2 The
more recent Commission Regulation 556/89 [hereinafter the Know-How
Regulation] also applies Article 85(3) to certain know-how53 and mixed
patent/know-how licensing agreements.54 The Know-How Regulation
deems that ". . . Article 85(1) of the Treaty shall not apply to pure
49 Id. at Recital 9:
The obligations listed in Article 1 also generally fulfil the other conditions for the applica-
tion of Article 85(3). Consumers will as a rule be allowed a fair share of the benefits resulting
from the improvement in the supply of goods on the market....
50 Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, lists activities that are incompatible with
Common Market competition policy. Article 85(1) states:
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the Common Market: all agree-
ments between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices
which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the
prevention, restrictions or distortion of competition within the common market, and in particu-
lar those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investments;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusions of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supple-
mentary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connec-
tion with the subject of such contracts.
51 Article 85(3) of the Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, states:
The provisions of paragraph I may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings,
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings, and
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices:
which contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit,
and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the
attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a
substantial part of the products in question.
52 See Regulation 2349/84, supra note 10, at Preamble.
53 "Know-how" is defined as "non-patented technical information (e.g. descriptions of manufac-
turing processes, recipes, formulae, designs or drawings) .... Regulation 556/89, supra note 10, at
art. I.
54 See Regulation 556/89, supra note 10, at Preamble; see also id. at art. 1(7)(1).
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know-how licensing agreements and to mixed know-how and patent li-
censing agreements not exempted by Regulation 2349/84."55 Thus, the
Know-How Regulation applies to any patent license that provides know-
how in addition to supplying the subject-matter of the patent.56
In some cases, the Know-How Regulation goes even further than
the Patent Regulation in terms of the scope of the exemption. 57 Thus,
the Know-How Regulation could serve to exempt some patent licenses
which would not come under the exemptions of the Patent Regulation.58
In the definitional section of the Know-How Regulation 59, mixed know-
how and patent licensing agreements are defined as "agreements not ex-
empted by Regulation 2349/84 under which a technology containing
both non-patented elements and elements that are patented in one or
more Member States is licensed."'  The importance of mixed know-
how/patent licensing agreements is underscored in Recital 2 of the
Know-How Regulation, which states "[a]s well as pure know-how agree-
ments, mixed know-how and patent licensing agreements play an in-
creasingly important role in the transfer of technology. '61  Recital 2
further states that the Know-How Regulation includes within its scope
"mixed agreements which are not exempted by Commission Regulation
2349/84. " 62
Thus, even a license provision that falls under the blacklist63 of the
Patent Regulation may, in some cases, qualify for an exemption under
the Know-How Regulation. For example, both the Patent Regulation
and the Know-How Regulation include in their respective blacklist (i.e.,
disqualify for exemption) a license agreement in which a limitation is
placed on the quantity of licensed product a licensee can produce or limi-
55 Id. at art. 1(1).
56 See V. KORAH, KNOW-HOW LICENSING AGREEMENTS AND THE EEC COMPETITION RULES
REGULATION 556/89 85 (1989) ("[Ihe know-how exemption applies to a mixed licence that comes
within the definition of a patent licence under the patent regulation."). Regulation 556/89 applies
not only to know-how licenses, but also to licenses that cover patents coupled with know-how rele-
vant to the patent. In some respects, such licenses may be treated more liberally than pure patent
licenses.
57 Id. at 88.
58 This assumes, of course, that the license in question is a mixed patent/know-how license.
59 Regulation 556/89, supra note 10, at art. 1(7).
60 Id. at art. 1(7)(6).
61 Id. at Recital 2; see also Bleeke & Rahl, supra note 18 and accompanying text. The Bleeke
and Rahl study supports the view stated in the Regulation.
62 Regulation 556/89, supra note 10, at Recital 2 (emphasis added). The same language is found
in Regulation 556/89 at art. 1(7)(6) (definition section).
63 The "blacklist" is a list of license provisions to which articles I and 2(2) of the regulations do
not apply (Le. such provisions are not exempt under Article 85(3) and may subject the parties to




tations on the number of operations exploiting the licensed technology. 6"
However, the Know-How Regulation, but not the Patent Regulation, al-
lows an exception for a quantity limitation when the limitation is specifi-
cally directed "to the quantities [the licensee] requires in manufacturing
his own products and to sell the licensed product only as an integral part
... of his own products .... "6' The result is that one can avoid the
prohibition of quantity limitations in certain situations if the license cov-
ers both the patent and the know-how relating to the patent.66
Conversely, the Patent Regulation provides broader exemption cov-
erage, for example, in the case in which a licensor attempts to restrict
exploitation of the patent to the life of the license agreement. Such an
arrangement comes under the white list of the Patent Regulation 67 , but is
not addressed by the Know-How Regulation 6'. Assuming that a license
contains both patent and know-how, the licensor and licensee may
choose under which regulation to bring the license. Professor Korah
notes that it is almost always the case that the Know-How Regulation is
more permissive than the Patent Regulation.69 However, that conclusion
is not absolute given the ambiguity of certain provisions in both Regula-
tions.70 It is unclear how the Court of Justice or the Commission would
view a given license provision under the two regulations and there is little
case law to provide guidance. Therefore, it may be important that the
parties71 to a license draft the license in such a way as to bring it under
64 Compare Regulation 556/89 with Regulation 2349/84.
65 Regulation 556/89, supra note 10, at art. l(l)(8).
66 Professor Korah notes another example of the breadth of the Know-How Regulation which is
contained in Recital 2 of that regulation. The Know-How Regulation includes as its subject matter
"mixed agreements not exempted by the patent regulation." The Recital then provides two exam-
ples of mixed agreements, the second of which would be blacklisted under Article 3 of the Patent
Regulation. See Regulation 556/89, supra note 10, at Recital 2; V. KORAH, supra note 56, at 90.
67 Regulation 2349/84, supra note 10, at art. 2(l)(4). The "white list" is a list of licensing provi-
sions that do not implicate Article I of the regulation and are not generally considered restrictive of
competition. See, eg., id. at art. 2(l).
68 This means that the licensor would have to apply for an individual exemption under the
Know-How Regulation.
69 V. KORAH, supra note 56, at 89, n.4. Professor Korah provides three examples of when the
Patent Regulation is more permissive: 1) when the parties wish to extend territorial protection under
the license by the addition of know-how (the Patent Regulation does not blacklist such an agreement
when the parties each have an opportunity to rescind the agreement annually); 2) when the parties
desire protection from passive sales (art. l(l)(6) of both Regulations) and the license was granted
before the goods were first put on the market; and 3) when a leader must perform too much process-
ing for the agreement to come under Regulation 1983/83, and the agreement may come under the
Patent Regulation but not the Know-How Regulation.
70 See, e.g., text accompanying note 82.
71 Both the Patent Regulation and the Know-How Regulation apply only to agreements under-
taken by no more than two parties. See Regulation 2349/84, supra note 10, at Preamble. However,
unlimited repetitions of two-party agreements are allowable as long as each is limited to two parties.
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the appropriate regulation. However, one cannot apply broad general-
izations with any certainty at this time and it would be advisable to look
carefully at both regulations before drafting a license agreement for use
in the European Community. Indeed, as will be shown below, differences
in the way in which the two regulations treat field-of-use are important
considerations for licensor and licensee alike.
B. Application of the Regulations to Field-of-Use Restrictions
Both the Patent Regulation and the Know-How Regulation contain
provisions which deal with the field-of-use restriction, and the provisions
in both regulations are found in the white list.72 The provisions are
worded identically with one exception. Article 2 of the Patent Regula-
tion states, in pertinent part:
Article 2
(1) Article 1 shall apply notwithstanding the presence in particular of any
of the following obligations, which are generally not restrictive of
competition:
3. an obligation on the licensee to restrict the exploitation of the li-
censed invention to one or more technical fields of application covered by
the licenced patent.73
The Know-How Regulation differs in that it contains not only the afore-
mentioned language, but also additional wording to the effect that re-
stricting use of the technology to "one or more product markets" is also
exempt.74 The Know-How Regulation states, in pertinent part:
Article 2
(1) Article 1 shall apply notwithstanding the presence in particular of any
of the following obligations, which are generally not restrictive of
competition:
8. an obligation on the licensee to restrict his exploitation of the li-
censed technology to one or more technical fields of application covered by
the licensed technology or to one or more product markets.7 5
The meaning of "technical fields" in both regulations is unclear, as
is the meaning of "product markets" in the Know-How Regulation. As
mentioned above, the addition of "product markets" to the Know-How
Regulation may give that regulation greater breadth than that of the Pat-
72 For the provisions contained in the Patent Regulation, see Regulation 2349/84, supra note 10,
at art. 2(1)(3); for the provisions contained in the Know-How Regulation, see Regulation 556/89,
supra note 10, at art. 2(l)(8). See also supra note 67.
73 Regulation 2349/84, supra note 10, at art. 2(l)(3).
74 Regulation 556/89, supra note 10, at art. 2(l)(8).
75 Id. (emphasis added).
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ent Regulation.76 Due to the consequences of this important distinction,
the application of the two regulations will be dealt with separately here.
L Application of Regulation 2349/84 (The Patent Regulation) to
Field-of- Use Restrictions
In drafting the Patent Regulation77, the Commission was concerned
that field-of-use restrictions might lead to customer allocation.78 There-
fore, it applied the full force of Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome to
licenses that have the effect of restricting the customers with whom a
licensee may deal.7 9 This point is made clear in the blacklist, which
states that, notwithstanding articles 1 and 2(2), one party may not be
restricted as to the customers it serves, "in particular by employing cer-
tain forms of distribution or with the aim of sharing customers, using
certain types of packaging for the products save as provided in Article
1(l)(7) and Article 2(1)(3). ' '80 Thus, a restriction on the field-of-use to
which a licensee may put the patent is valid as long as doing so cannot be
taken as a means of dividing customers.
Exactly where the Commission intends to draw the line between a
valid field-of-use restriction and an invalid customer allocation is un-
clear. Any license that restricts fields will, de facto, divide customers.
However, it appears that merely restricting fields, and thereby the cus-
tomers available to the licensee, is not what the Commission contem-
plates in applying the blacklist provision of article 3(l)(7). It is only
when the purported field-of-use restriction is a guise for an anticompeti-
tive provision that article 3(1)(7) applies. For example, in Windsurfing,
Int'l. v. EC Commission 81, the Commission rejected a field-of-use restric-
tion in a license for a sailing rig. In that case, Windsurfing licensed the
rig but attempted to limit it to use with a specific type of sailing board.
The Commission viewed the license restriction as more of a tying ar-
rangement and therefore not a valid field-of-use restriction. This case
76 See supra text accompanying note 56-60.
77 The Patent Regulation entered into force on 1 January 1985 and is due to expire on 31 De-
cember 1994. Given that the patent life is up to 20 years in many Member States, certain licensing
agreements now in force and others entered into between the present and 1994 will outlast the Patent
Regulation (unless that regulation is renewed). Thus, it may be advisable to make a provision (such
as a severance clause) for the expiration of the regulation.
78 See V. KORAH, PATENT LICENSING AND EEC COMPETITION RULES REGULATION 2349/84
50 (1985).
79 See Regulation 2349/84, supra note 10, at art. 3(l)(7).
80 Id.
81 1983 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 229) 1 (1983), aff'd, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 611, 3 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 489 (1986).
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presents an example of a use restriction that is actually a guise for an
anticompetitive goal.
While the process whereby the Commission characterizes a restric-
tion as either a valid field-of-use restriction or an attempt to divide cus-
tomers is unclear, even more unclear is the meaning of the phrase
"technical fields of application" as used in the Patent Regulation.82 It
may be that since the exemption does not apply to exclusive product
markets 3, it was the intention of the Commission that "one or more
technical fields" should refer to qualitatively different uses of the inven-
tion in substantially non-overlapping markets. If this is the case, the li-
censor should be allowed to divide the fields between clearly separate
applications of the patented subject matter as a technology-promoting
incentive and for the economic benefits discussed above. 4
2. Application of Regulation 556/89 (The Know-How Regulation) to
Field-of- Use Restrictions
As previously mentioned, the exemption for field-of-use restrictions
in the Know-How Regulation may be broader than the exemption con-
tained in the Patent Regulation. 5 This is due to language in the Know-
How Regulation, not present in the Patent Regulation, that exempts not
only restrictions as to "technical fields of application," but also restric-
tions as to specific product markets.8 6 The basis for the latter addition to
the Know-How Regulation is provided in Recital 16:
An obligation on the licensee to restrict his exploitation of the licensed tech-
nology to one or more technical fields of application or to one or more
product markets is also not caught by Article 85(l)(Article 2(l)(8)). This
obligation is not restrictive of competition since the licensor can be re-
garded as having the right to transfer the know-how only for a limited pur-
pose. Such a restriction must however not constitute a disguised means of
customer sharing.87
Although the definition of "product market" is not precise 88, the
presence of the additional language in the Know-How Regulation proba-
bly provides greater latitude for the licensor in controlling the disposition
of the licensed product in most instances. Know-how, unlike a patent on
a particular product, can conceivably be applied to a range of production
82 See supra text accompanying note 73.
83 This is the case with the Patent Regulation. See supra text accompanying note 78.
84 See supra text accompanying notes 18-32.
85 See supra text accompanying notes 56-71.
86 Regulation 556/89, supra note 10, at art. 2(1)(8).
87 Id. at Recital 16. As to the last sentence regarding customer sharing, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 77-80.
88 There is no explicit definition of "product market" in the Regulation.
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processes. For example, know-how regarding the use of an ionic field for
the separation of proteins by different molecular weights might also be
applied to the different and more lucrative field of separating DNA nec-
essary to take "DNA fingerprints."
C. Economic and Social Consequences of "Product Market"
Restrictions
Not allowing a licensor to restrict use in specific product markets
has the same adverse economic and social consequences as set forth
above for disallowing field-of-use restrictions.89 The result will be that
certain markets will not be served at all and that customers in the mar-
kets that are served by the patented subject matter or know-how will pay
a higher price.
The likelihood of this market discrepancy is greatest in the area of
know-how. Given the wide range of uses to which know-how can be
applied, the problem of free-riding is even more acute than in the case of
pure patent licensing.' If a licensee should be required to pay for what it
gets, then the licensor should be able to charge a royalty which is based
on the proposed uses to which the licensee wishes to put the knowledge
obtained from the licensor. If the licensor is not allowed to restrict fields,
licensees will either get a windfall or they will be required to pay for uses
that they do not want (a windfall for the licensor).91 Allowing a restric-
tion of product markets facilitates the proper allocation of cost.
D. Conclusions Regarding the Application of the Regulations
While neither the Commission nor the Court of Justice has yet to
squarely address the issue of defining terms in the Regulations, there is
hope that both bodies will recognize the practical exigencies of adminis-
tration of the Regulations. However, "[s]ince 'technical fields of applica-
tion' is not a term of art and there is yet no case law, it will continue to be
difficult or impossible to advise firmly whether particular clauses fall into
the white or black list."9 2 Therefore, it may be prudent to include lan-
guage in the field-of-use clause that clearly indicates that the division
pertains to "technical fields of application" and not to customer alloca-
tion (or other blacklisted activities).93
89 See supra text accompanying notes 18-40.
90 See supra text accompanying notes 18-36.
91 The problem is the same as that in the high-demand/low-demand case described for patented
technology. See supra text accompanying notes 18-36.
92 V. KORAH, supra note 56, at 155.
93 However, the licensor cannot attempt to control the activities of a purchaser of the licensee.
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Under the Know-How Regulation, licensors may be able to engage
in more restrictive practices. In cases in which that is true, it is prudent
to invoke the Know-How Regulation by licensing, in addition to the pat-
ented product, the know-how necessary for use of the patent. By doing
so, a licensor can maximize his or her right to restrict use of the inven-
tion. The licensor is aided in this endeavor by the latitude usually given
to characterization of an agreement under the competition laws of the
European Communities.
IV. FIELD-OF-USE RESTRICTIONS UNDER UNITED STATES
ANTITRUST LAW
Licensing agreements in the United States are governed by the appli-
cable antitrust laws and the court decisions interpreting them.94 As in
the European Communities, the United States courts have generally ap-
proved of field-of-use restrictions in patent licenses. 95 However, there are
numerous potential differences between the law in the European Com-
munities and that in the United States. For example, it is unclear
whether United States courts define field-of-use to mean the same thing
that "technical fields of application" 96 means in the European Communi-
ties. The United States courts also have not squarely addressed what
distinctions, if any, exist between the restriction of field-of-use and the
restriction of product markets in the context of licensing.97 Finally,
courts in the United States have spent little time dealing with customer
restrictions in the patent context. However, vertical customer restric-
tions outside the area of patent licensing fall under the rule of reason.98
Thus, it is possible that such restrictions in patent licensing agreements
would also be analyzed under the rule of reason.
A. United States Judicial Attitude Toward Field-of-Use Restrictions
The seminal case addressing the validity of field-of-use restrictions
Therefore, a field-of-use restriction can still be broken - albeit one step removed from the original
restriction. Conversation with Professor Valentine Korah (Feb. 15, 1991).
94 In the United States, the right to license one's invention is a common-law right not provided
for in the patent statute. See Bendix Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 421 F.2d 809 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 911 (1970); L.L. Brown Co. v. Hydroiloid, Inc., 32 F. Supp. 857 (1939), aff'd, 118 F.2d 674
(1941).
95 See, e.g., General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175, aff'd on reh'g,
305 U.S. 124 (1938); Benger Laboratories Ltd. v. R.K. Laros Co., 209 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd
317 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1962); cert. denied, 375 U.S. 833 (1963).
96 See supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
97 See supra text accompanying notes 75-81.
98 Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977); see also White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
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in patent license agreements is General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western
Electric Company.99 In that case, the licensor granted a particular licen-
see the right to manufacture and sell patented amplifiers which were suit-
able for use in either the home or commercial motion picture fields. The
license agreement contained a clause restricting the licensee to sales for
use in the private home as opposed to sales to commercial users. The
licensee, however, sold some amplifiers manufactured by it to the Gen-
eral Talking Pictures Corp., knowing that General Talking Pictures
would use the amplifiers in a commercial theater.
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Bran-
deis, held that when an invention is capable of use in different fields, a
licensor of the invention may lawfully restrict the license to manufacture
and sale of the patented invention for use in only one or some of several
distinct fields in which it is useful. l° The holding in General Talking
Pictures stands today as the rule regarding field-of-use restrictions in pat-
ent licenses. 101 However, Justice Brandeis' holding allowing the field-of-
use restriction was not justified by an increase in competition or social
surplus. Rather, the opinion referred to the fact that since
the amplifiers were made and sold outside the scope of the license the effect
is precisely the same as if no license whatsoever had been granted to Trans-
former Company. And as Pictures Corporation knew the facts, it is in no
better position than if it had manufactured the amplifiers itself without a
license. It is liable because it used the invention without license to do so. 102
Thus, Justice Brandeis argued more from the position that since the pat-
entee has the right to exclude the entire invention from public use, the
patentee has the less-inclusive right to exclude the invention from a par-
ticular public use.103
United States courts have followed General Talking Pictures in that
they have upheld field-of-use restrictions such as those pertaining to the
class of customers to which a licensee could sell 04 and restrictions on the
type of design of objects on which a patented process could be used 105.
However, courts have distinguished General Talking Pictures in situa-
99 304 U.S. 175, aff'd on reh'g, 305 U.S. 124 (1938); see also supra note 95 and accompanying
text.
100 General Talking Pictures, 305 U.S. at 127.
101 General Talking Pictures is also interesting because the licensor's subsidiary manufactured the
amplifiers for commercial use. Thus, the licensor and licensee would have been competitors had it
not been for the field-of-use restriction.
102 General Talking Pictures, 305 U.S. at 127.
103 Such a view has come under criticism. See, eg., Adelman & Juenger, Patent Antitrust: Patent
Dynamics and Field-of-Use Licensing, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 273, 280-289 (1975).
I4 Armstrong v. Motorola, Inc., 374 F.2d 764 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967).
105 Bela Seating Co. v. Poloron Prod., 297 F. Supp. 489 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd, 438 F.2d 733 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971).
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tions in which the licensor attempted to extend the patent monopoly.106
Also, courts have refused to extend the rationale to individuals who
purchase from the licensee."°7 While these and other decisions108 still
appear to be good law, their rationale, based on the per se illegality of
vertical restraints, may have been undercut by the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Continental T. V v. GTE Sylvania 1 that all non-price vertical re-
straints should be analyzed under the rule of reason."'
B. Status of Field-of-Use Restrictions
During the early 1970s, the United States Justice Department
sought to challenge the continued validity of the field-of-use restriction111
by filing a number of civil actions specifically challenging such restric-
tions112 . For example, in United States v. Ciba-Geigy Corporation,'13 the
Justice Department argued that a restriction on a manufacturing licensee
preventing it from selling a patented drug in bulk was aper se violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.'14 The Justice Department again argued
for the per se illegality of use restrictions in United States v. Studiengesell-
schaftKohle.115 The Government's hostility toward licensing restrictions
culminated with the proclamation of the nine No-No's in 1975.116 While
the nine No-No's were eventually rescinded117, the court's continued ac-
ceptance of the Justice Department's former views is still an issue (at
least in private suits). 118
106 See Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton v. Tatnall Measuring Systems Co., 169 F. Supp. I (E.D. Pa.
1958) (in which the licensor attempted to require the licensee to sell a patented strain gage only with
a non-patented machine manufactured by the licensor).
107 See, eg., United States v. Glaxo Group, 328 F. Supp. 709 (D.D.C. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds, 410 U.S. 52 (1973) (attempt to restrain licensee of bulk form of patented drug from selling
in dosage form); see also Hensley Equip. Co. v. Esco Corp., 383 F.2d 252 (5th Cir.), modified, 386
F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1967).
108 See, eg., A & E Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968); Hazeltine
Research v. Admiral Corp., 183 F.2d 953 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 896 (1950).
109 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
110 See Marks, supra note 7, at 982.
111 Donnem, The Antitrust Attack on Restrictive Patent License Provisions (address given Sept. 25,
1969), reprinted in 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 0,111, at 55,154 (stating that nothing in the patent laws
gives the licensor the inherent right to use field-of-use restrictions in its licenses).
112 See Adeliman & Juenger, supra note 45, at 273.
113 508 F. Supp. 1118 (D.C. N.J. 1976).
114 Id. (the Justice Department did not prevail on this point).
115 670 F.2d 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In that case, the D.C. Circuit reversed a decision in favor of
the Government and held that use restrictions should be judged under the rule of reason. Cf. Ethyl
Corp. v. Hercules Powder Co., 232 F. Supp. 453 (D. Del. 1963).
116 The nine No-No's were a statement of Justice Department policy regarding certain patent
licensing restrictions. See Rule, supra note 4, at 365, n.1.
117 Id. at 365, n.2.
118 Id. at 366.
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In general, the Justice Department now supports the perspective,
outlined above1 19, that many licensing restrictions are actually pro-com-
petitive120 . Commentator Rule regards patent rights in the same way as
property rights in general: "The antitrust laws.., only condemn patent
licensing that either restricts competition among technologies that are
economic substitutes, or excludes technologies from the market, or is a
sham designed to coordinate the pricing of products only remotely re-
lated to the patent." '121 Thus, it appears that licensors will not be subject
to Justice Department scrutiny unless a field-of-use provision can be con-
strued as a guise for an anticompetitive restriction. A license should not
endeavor to restrain price in competing technologies owned by the licen-
122sor 2, nor should the license contain provisions that facilitate collusion
among competing technologies or exclude certain technologies from the
marketplace 123. However, "[i]t will be rare, indeed, that a restriction
will so enable a patent owner to 'corner' an input market that new tech-
nologies will be excluded from the market."124 The comment of Rule's
successor, James F. Rill, that "[]oint ventures will be encouraged or not
encouraged because they make economic sense," '125 perhaps indicates the
current Administration's general sensitivity to the economic benefits of
some restrictive practices. 126
V. CONCLUSIONS: COMMON GROUND BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES?
Field-of-use restrictions represent valid means of promoting the le-
gitimate exploitation of patented technology. Such restrictions make it
possible for the invention to be introduced into several markets simulta-
119 See supra text accompanying notes 18-36.
120 See generally Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, United States
Department of Justice Guidelines 22-27 (Nov. 10, 1988) [hereinafter Justice Department
Guidelines].
121 Rule, supra note 4, at 369.
122 Such restrictions would likely be analyzed as horizontal restraints and would only be prob-
lematic if the parties involved have substantial market power. A discussion of this is beyond the
scope of this article. However, the Justice Department might analyze such a situation in a manner
similar to that used in assessing joint ventures.
123 See Justice Department Guidelines, supra note 120.
124 Rule, supra note 4, at 371-72.
125 Comment, Tuning in to HDTV- Can Production Joint Ventures Improve America's High-Tech
Picture?, 44 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1159, 1192, n.189 (1990) (citing Forbes, Sept. 4, 1989, at 20).
126 See 53 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 409 in which Rill lauds pro-competitive joint ventures. How-
ever, it should be noted that joint ventures have traditionally been treated leniently by the United
States for foreign investment purposes. The same may not-be true for treatment of licensing agree-
ments. However, the point is made to provide some indication of the current Administration's sensi-
tivity to procompetitive activities.
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neously while preserving the licensor's opportunity to obtain full and fair
profits. 127 Use restrictions also facilitate market entry and, when written
in conjunction with exclusivity provisions, inhibit uneconomical rent
seeking by either party. 128
These propositions are reflected in the general attitude in both the
United States and in the European Economic Community that field-of-
use restrictions in technology license agreements are not aper se violation
of the competition laws.'29 However, the development of the law has
taken a different course under the two systems. 130  The law relating to
field-of-use in the United States developed out of a judicial concern that
the full integrity of a patentee's rights to exclusive use of the invention be
maintained. 13 1 The law in the European Communities came about
through the implementation of the Commission regulations, which are
more directly concerned with promoting economic benefit and control-
ling restraint of trade.'32 While the law may have developed differently
in the two systems, both systems recognize the value of allowing licens-
ing restrictions that have a favorable effect on competition.
However, the different basis for the development of the law under
the two systems may have a profound effect on the way in which field-of-
use restrictions are regarded in the future. For example, United States
antitrust law is governed by general statutory schemes that leave it to the
courts to fill in the details. On the contrary, law in the European Com-
munities develops through the promulgation of more specific regulations
and by caselaw, thereby establishing a uniform law for the Common
Market. Thus, the European Commission is primarily responsible for
making policy in order that litigation of the individual case may be
avoided, whereas United States judges are primarily responsible for ap-
plying the law to the facts of the specific case before them under vague
statutory directives.
The European Commission must promulgate law to deal with the
bulk of Community policy, taking care not to upset the balance of inter-
national trade and not to offend the Member States too much. The result
is that the law of the European Communities is more predictable and
provides more initial guidance than the law of the United States.
The practical impact of this dichotomy is perhaps best illustrated by
an example which compares the way in which a typical field-of-use re-
127 Id.
128 See supra text accompanying notes 46-49.
129 See supra text accompanying notes 77-93 and 94-126.
130 Compare supra text accompanying notes 77-93 with text accompanying notes 94-126.
131 See General Talking Pictures, supra note 99 and accompanying discussion.
132 See supra text accompanying notes 50-71.
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striction might be treated in the United States under the doctrine of Gen-
eral Talking Pictures133 versus the way in which the European
Community might deal with the restriction under the regulations. Con-
sider again the discovery of Buckyballs discussed above. 134 Suppose that
Buckyballs are granted a product patent and the patentee wishes to li-
cense them in the United States. Further, suppose that the patentee
wishes to restrict certain licensees to use of the Buckyballs only as com-
ponents of batteries, while restricting others to the more lucrative field of
lubricants. The resulting license to the lubricant manufacture contains a
field-of-use restriction whereby the licensee is restricted to the use of
Buckyballs as additives in the process of producing lubricants.
If the above-mentioned provision were examined by a United States
court in response to a charge that the restriction violates the antitrust
laws, it is likely that the doctrine of General Talking Pictures would ap-
ply and the field-of-use restriction would be upheld. The general propo-
sition that a field-of-use restriction is legal would apply because the
restriction is within the scope of the patentee's larger right to the whole
invention. If a court were to analyze the economic consequences of the
restriction, it would likely restrict its analysis to the facts of the case
before it. Thus, different cases might yield different results; the outcome
may also depend on the court which hears the case. However, it is gener-
ally true that a United States court will uphold an unambiguous field-of-
use restriction.
Now, suppose that the same licensor wishes to use the above license
provision as part of a license for the invention in the European Commu-
nities. Depending on whether the license contained a grant of know-how
in addition to the grant to manufacture, use, or sell Buckyballs as addi-
tives in lubricants, the Patent Regulation and/or the Know-How Regula-
tion might apply. In either case, it is likely that the division of fields, as
written, would fall under the protection of the regulations as a pro-com-
petitive field-of-use restriction. A clearly drafted, unambiguous license
may never come up before the Commission. Indeed, the purpose of the
regulations in general is to reduce litigation of frequently-encountered
issues.
However, even more certainty could be had in this case by re-writ-
ing the field-of-use restriction in such a way as to parallel the language in
the regulations. For example, the European license could specifically de-
fine the "technical fields of application" and/or "product markets" in-
volved, stating that they are distinct. Further, the license could be
133 See supra note 99.
134 See supra text accompanying note 28.
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written to specifically forbid a division of customers. In other words, it
may be possible to mold a license provision in such a way that it con-
forms directly to the regulations - something that cannot be done in the
United States. As to whether such a tailor-made license would be accept-
able in the United States, it would again depend, to an extent, on the
court.
If the foregoing is true, it should be European Community law and
not United States law that provides the framework for the drafting of
license restrictions in the international context. There appears to be
much more predictability in the European Community regulations than
in the United States law as it has developed in the courts. The regula-
tions are usually drafted with a specific social or economic policy goal in
mind that is intended to have effect in the entire Community and to pro-
vide guidance to businesses subject to the regulations. In contrast,
United States common law sometimes develops on a regional level and
can often be limited to the facts of the particular case in which the issue
has been previously raised.
In considering field-of-use restrictions specifically, it is evident that
the law has developed in a different manner under the two systems. As
mentioned, the Commission was concerned with the economic welfare of
the Community, and the Patent and Know-How Regulations were
adopted out of that concern. The United States attitude toward patents
has been primarily one that sees the patent as a property right.135 The
European Community regulations and their underlying rationale are
analogous to a situation in which the United States Congress would pass
legislation specifically dealing with the legality of various license restric-
tions. If Congress passed such legislation, it would be much simpler for
parties to a license to rely, ex ante, on the legislation in writing a license
that would be less likely to be challenged. Since the European Commu-
nity has, in essence, done exactly this via the regulations, it is the regula-
tions and not the more ambiguous United States common law that
should be the driving force behind international agreements. 136
There also exist differences in enforcement that may affect the use of
specific licensing provisions. For example, while the rule-of-reason ap-
proach in the United States is uncertain, it is balanced by its availability
as a defense and the relatively high cost of private enforcement. In the
135 See, e.g., Rule, supra note 4, at 367; see also supra discussion of General Talking Pictures
accompanying notes 95-103.
136 However, a provision that is ambiguous may come under scrutiny in both the European Com-
munities and in the United States as both systems are aware of and condemn practices such as
division of customers and other anti-competitive practices. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 7, at 981.
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European Communities, on the other hand, the regulations provide more
certainty but also less of a defense to a charge that a specific provision is
anti-competitive. Thus, in Europe one may be well advised to draft a
field of use restriction with particularity as to the "technical field(s)" in
which the manufacture, use, or sale of the invention is limited; whereas
in the United States, one might be able to legally draft a more expansive
provision due to the more amorphous guidelines set forth by United
States courts. However, as stated previously, a license provision for use
in both the United States and the European Communities might best be
drafted from the solid ground of the regulations.
